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Combinatorial t-designs are a class of highly regular set systems subject to inter-
esting incidence conditions. These objects have been found to be very useful in
applications ranging from tournament scheduling to traﬃc routing in communica-
tion networks. In the work presented here, we use a particularly nicely-structured
class of combinatorial designs, known as symmetric 2-designs, to solve a problem
concerning secure re-keying in a wireless communication system after the ejection
of one or more users from the network. We show that employing a symmetric
2-design as a key distribution in this type of system provides a number of bene-
fits, including collusion prevention and provably light loads for the base station to
execute necessary secure re-keying operations. We show that a class of symmetric
2-design key distribution allows for minimal re-keying procedures after multiple
simultaneous user ejections and that this problem is NP-hard for arbitrary key
distributions. For cases where the structure of symmetric 2-designs is insuﬃcient
to make these strong claims, we present a novel algorithm for identifying a col-
lection of keys suﬃcient to re-key a network after any number of ejections. We
provide simulation results to show that for symmetric 2-design key distributions
this algorithm performs significantly better than existing solutions. To make these
guarantees, we draw connections between combinatorial designs, cover-free families
and various key distribution methodologies. We conclude by presenting a sample
application of this machinery, namely the advanced metering infrastructure being
deployed to monitor end-user electricity consumption as part of the smart grid.
The wireless sensors employed in this scheme have tight constraints on memory,
computation and power, and so symmetric encryption is a natural choice for data
security. The distribution of the cryptographic keys necessary for these operations
is diﬃcult, and fluid group membership further complicates the problem. The
widespread adoption of AMI has the potential to significantly increase the eﬃ-
ciency of the power distribution network. The acceptability of AMI to consumers
is directly tied to their perceived security; a robust infrastructure is necessary to
assure consumers of the protection of their personal information.
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CHAPTER 1
T -DESIGNS
1.1 Introduction
Design theory is a branch of combinatorics which is concerned with various forms of
incidence among subsets drawn from some underlying support set. Over the course
of its development, design theory has been shown to have remarkable connections
to diverse areas of mathematics including number theory, finite geometry, linear
error-correcting codes and graph theory. Given the breadth of its reach, it may be
surprising to learn that the earliest roots of design theory find themselves among
the recreational mathematics of the mid-1800s. Kirkman posed perhaps the first
problem in design theory in an 1847 edition of Lady and Gentleman’s Diary :
“Fifteen young ladies in a school walk out three abreast for seven days
in succession: it is required to arrange them daily so that no two shall
walk twice abreast.”
For obvious reasons, this statement is known as Kirkman’s schoolgirl problem. Few
branches of pure mathematics are conceived in magazines, and the fact that design
theory bucks this trend is a testament both to its often seemingly simple problem
statements and to its utility in modeling real-world situations. As with all problems
in the field, Kirkman’s school problem is concerned with a collection of elements
and the exact way in which subsets of those elements are related to one another.
For instance, here Kirkman stipulates that any pair of school girls appears in at
most one row. If we take the school girls as our elements and define incidence to
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mean being located together in a row, then any pair of elements is incident at most
once. To put this qualitative definition on firm mathematical footing, a more basic
definition is first needed.
Definition 1.1.1. A (finite) set system is an ordered pair (X,B) in which X is
a (finite) set and B is a collection of subsets of X. We will call the elements of
X points and the sets of B blocks. We say a set system is uniform if all blocks
have the same cardinality and regular if all points occur in the same number of
blocks.
Note that this definition does not specify that the collection B is itself a set;
there may exist identical blocks in B. Set systems are an incredibly diverse and
flexible class of mathematical objects. The pair (V, E) consisting of the vertices
and (hyper)edges of a (hyper)graph constitute a set system. The matroid (M, I)
consisting of a ground set and a collection of independent sets also defines a set
system. A probability space (Ω,F , P ) can be thought of a set system in which the
collection of subsets F ⊆ 2Ω forms a σ-algebra, together with a probability measure
P . Most importantly for the work presented here is the class of set systems known
as t-designs.
1.2 t-designs
The combinatorial objects known as t-designs grew out of the seminal works of
19th century mathematicians such as Kirkman and Steiner. These designs are
most fundamentally uniform and regular set systems with an additional incidence
condition.
Definition 1.2.1. A set system (X,B) is a t-(v, b, r, k,λ) design if
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(1) |X| = v
(2) |B| = b
(3) every x ∈ X occurs in exactly r sets in B
(4) |B| = k for all B ∈ B
(5) every t-subset of X appears in exactly λ blocks in B.
We call r and k the replication number and block size, respectively. Note that
even here the property that B is a set, that is, that there are no repeated blocks,
is not required a priori. Designs containing no repeated blocks are often referred
to as simple. For the balance of this work, we will assume that every design which
we introduce is simple. We will also omit from consideration the complete design
which is composed of all k-subsets of X with t ≤ k.
Conditions (1)-(4) impose uniformity and regularity on the set system. It is
condition (5) that puts t-designs apart from all other set systems, and indeed it is
not easily satisfied. Designs with t = 1 are redundantly defined, as condition (3)
would imply that r = λ in this case. We will therefore always assume that t > 1.
Designs with t = 2 have been relatively well-studied and will be main mathematical
tool used in the applications featured here. Some infinite classes of t-designs with
small λ are known for t > 2. For instance, there is a 3-(q2 + 1, q + 1, 1) design, a
so-called Mo¨bius or inversive plane, for every prime power q [11]. However, no t-
(v, b, r, k,λ) design is known to exist for any t > 5 and λ < 4 [11]. Determining how
many if any t-(v, k, 1) designs exist for large t is one of the largest open problems
in design theory.
The parameters of a t-(v, b, r, k,λ) design are not independent of one another.
Simple algebraic equations allow us to write any two of the parenthetical parame-
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ters in terms of the remaining three. The proofs of these well-known theorems are
included here both for completeness and so that the reasoning and methods found
in the original work presented later will have proper motivation.
Result 1.2.1. The parameters of a t-(v, b, r, k,λ) design (X,B) satisfy bk = vr.
Proof. We will count the total number of points in all blocks in two ways. There
are b blocks in B, each containing exactly k points. Additionally, there are v points
in X, each occurring in exactly r blocks. Hence, the total number of points in the
design is bk = vr.
Result 1.2.2. The parameters of a t-(v, b, r, k,λ) design (X,B) satisfy λ(v− 1) =
r(k − 1).
Proof. Fix x ∈ X. We will count the number of pairs (x, y), y ∈ X and y ￿= x,
occurring in all blocks in B. For all v − 1 choices of suitable y there exist exactly
λ blocks containing both x and y. For the right side of the equality, the point
x occurs in exactly r blocks, and in each there are exactly k − 1 other distinct
points.
Despite the fact that Result 1.2.1 and Result 1.2.2 imply that there exists a
more concise notation which describes any t-(v, b, r, k,λ) design, we will continue
to use this expanded version for clarity’s sake, except in one particular class that
will be introduced below.
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Example 1.2.1 ([11]). Let X = {a, b, . . . , o} and define
B = {abc, djn, ehm, fio, gkl
ahi, beg, cmn, dko, fjl
ajk, bmo, cef, dhl, gin
ade, bln, cij, fkm, gho
afg, bhj, clo, dim, ekn
alm, bik, cdg, ejo, fhn
ano, bdf, chk, eil, gjm}. (1.1)
The pair (X,B) is a 2-(15, 35, 7, 3, 1) design. If we associate each a, b, . . . , o dis-
tinctly with one of 15 school girls, take the blocks of B as the rows of girls and
take each of the rows of this array of B as one of the days of the week, then this
presentation of (X,B) is a solution to Kirkman’s schoolgirl problem.
Example 1.2.2. Let X = {0, 1, . . . , 6} and define
B = {{0, 1, 3}, {1, 2, 4},{2, 3, 5}, {3, 4, 6},
{4, 5, 0}, {5,6, 1}, {6, 0, 2}}. (1.2)
One can verify that (X,B) is 2-(7, 7, 3, 3, 1) design. This design can be identified
with the projective geometry PG(2,2) which will be discussed in Section 1.3.1. It
is commonly known as the Fano plane.
We note that in this particular case the number of points v equals the number
of blocks b, and the replication number r equals the block size k. This additional
structure is indicative of a larger class of 2-(v, v, k, k,λ) designs which have been
by far the most extensively investigated in design theory literature.
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1.3 Symmetric 2-Designs
Fischer’s inequality states that for any 2-(v, b, r, k,λ) design the number of blocks
is at least the number of points, that is b ≥ v. The class of 2-designs which meet
this bound with equality are called symmetric.
Definition 1.3.1. A symmetric 2-(v, k,λ) design of order q = k − λ is a 2-
(v, v, k, k,λ) design.
We will sometimes refer to a symmetric 2-(v, k,λ) design simply as a symmetric
design if the parameters are either clear or irrelevant. Here the term “symmetric”
refers not to any geometrical property necessarily, but rather to the equivalence
of the conditions on the numbers of blocks and points and on the block size and
the replication number. For reasons that we will not delve into here, some au-
thors prefer to use the term square to describe 2-(v, v, k, k,λ) designs. Symmetric
designs have yet another interesting (and useful) equivalence between blocks and
points: any two blocks have intersection cardinality λ. In fact, these symmetries
are themselves equivalent.
Theorem 1.3.1. Given a 2-(v, b, r, k,λ) design (X,B), the following are equiva-
lent:
(1) v = b,
(2) r = k,
(3) any two blocks share exactly λ points.
Proof. Result 1.2.1 shows the bidirectional equivalence (1) ⇔ (2). To see, (3) ⇒
(1), consider a set system constructed in the following way. For each x ∈ X, define
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B￿x = {B ∈ B : x ∈ B}, and let B￿ = {B￿x}x∈X be the collection of these sets
with x ranging over X. Then the pair (B,B￿) form a 2-design by hypothesis (3); it
is easy to verify that 2-design axioms hold. Fisher’s inequality then implies that
|B| ≤ |B￿| = |X|. But since (X,B) is a 2-design, Fisher’s inequality also implies
that |X| ≤ |B| and hence v = |X| = |B| = b.
For (1) ⇒ (3), fix a block B ∈ B and let λi be the number of points shared
between B and Bi ∈ {B1, B2, . . . , Bv−1}. (We have assumed (1), as well, since we
have shown (1) ⇒ (2) previously.) Each of the k points of B occurs in exactly
k − 1 other blocks in B, leading to the equation
k(k − 1) =
v−1￿
i=1
λi. (1.3)
Then by Result 1.2.2 with r = k, we have
λ =
1
v − 1
v−1￿
i=1
λi, (1.4)
so that the first moment of any collection {λi} is λ. Suppose that λ = 1. Each
λi is a non-negative integer, and since λ = 1, every two points occurs in exactly
1 block so that λi < 2 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , v − 1. Then Equation 1.4 implies that
λi = 1 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , v − 1. Since B was chosen arbitrarily, the desired result
holds for λ = 1.
Now suppose that λ > 1. Each of the
￿
k
2
￿
pairs of points from B occurs in
exactly λ− 1 other blocks, giving the relation
(λ− 1)
￿
k
2
￿
=
v−1￿
i=1
￿
λi
2
￿
(1.5)
(λ− 1)k(k − 1) =
v−1￿
i=1
λi(λi − 1). (1.6)
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Again using Result 1.2.2, we arrive at
λ(λ− 1) = 1
v − 1
v−1￿
i=1
λi(λi − 1) (1.7)
λ2 =
1
v − 1
v−1￿
i=1
λ2i , (1.8)
where the final line follows from the first moment result above. Hence, the second
(non-central) moment of any collection {λi} is λ2. The first and second moment
equations of {λi} are enough to show that λi = λ for all i = 1, 2, . . . , v − 1. We
can define an auxiliary integer-valued variable −λ ≤ δi ≤ k−λ for each λi so that
λi = λ+ δi. (1.9)
Then Equation 1.4 implies that
￿v−1
i=1 δi = 0. After substitution by the auxiliary
variable Equation 1.8 reads
λ2 =
1
v − 1
v−1￿
i=1
λ2i (1.10)
=
1
v − 1
v−1￿
i=1
(λ+ δi)
2 (1.11)
=
1
v − 1
v−1￿
i=1
(λ2 + 2λδi + δ
2
i ) (1.12)
= λ2 +
1
v − 1
v−1￿
i=1
δ2i , (1.13)
which holds only if δi = 0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , v − 1. Hence, the arbitrarily chosen
block B shares exactly λ points with any other block, and so any two blocks share
exactly λ points. Having shown (1) ⇔ (2) and (1) ⇔ (3), the desired result has
been proved.
To the author’s knowledge, the reasoning showing (1)⇒ (3) is novel. The stan-
dard technique requires the introduction of incidence matrices and relies heavily
on linear algebraic machinery. While powerful in its own right, this traditional
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approach does intentionally distance itself from the combinatorial nature of the
problem. The new approach maintains contact with the combinatorial underpin-
nings of the subject and shows that identical results are within reach using more
elementary tools.
The most powerful existence criteria concerning symmetric designs are the cel-
ebrated non-existence results due to Bruck and Ryser, who together proved the
result for λ = 1 [5], and Ryser and Chowla, who later extended the result for the
cases where λ > 1 [9].
Result 1.3.1 (Bruck-Ryser-Chowla). If a symmetric 2-(v, k,λ) design exists with
v even, then k − λ is a square. If a symmetric 2-(v, k,λ) design exists with v odd,
then the equation x2 = (k − λ)y2 + (−1)(v−1)/2λz2 has a nontrivial solution in the
integers.
The proof of this theorem is lengthy not especially informative to the material
covered in this text; it is available in most textbooks on design theory. It is a
testament to the wide mathematical connections of design theory that a question
involving only incidence between finite sets should involve the existence of solutions
of a Diophantine equation. In 1989, Lam, Thiel and Swiercz provided the most
recent advancement past the Bruck-Ryser-Chowla thereom by proving that there
does not exist a symmetric 2-(121,11,1) design via a computerized search [24].
1.3.1 Projective Planes
Singer provided the most well-known construction algorithm for symmetric 2-
designs. His method deals with vector space inclusion over a finite field. Designs
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generated in this fashion will be used in later as key distributions for group com-
munications systems. We will see that their properties allow for powerful results
concerning the ability to re-key the system after one or more user is ejected from
the network.
Result 1.3.2 (Singer, [35]). There exists a symmetric 2-(q2+q+1, q+1, 1) design
for every prime power q.
Proof. Let V be the 3-dimensional vector space over the finite field GF (q). Let the
points of X be the 1-dimensional subspaces of V . For each 2-dimensional subspace
W of V , define
BW = {U \ {0} : 0 ≤ U ≤ W ≤ V }, (1.14)
where the symbol ≤ denotes vector space inclusion. Then define a set system by
identifying points and blocks with each of the 1- and 2-dimensional subspaces of
V , respectively, and associating point-block incidence with vector space inclusion,
that is
B = {BW : W ≤ V, dim(W ) = 2}. (1.15)
It remains to verify that the conditions of a 2-design are satisfied.
Each 1-dimensional subspace of V contains exactly q−1 nonzero elements, and
after excluding the zero vector, these 1-dimensional subspaces partition the vectors
in V . Hence, the number of points is
|X| = q
3 − 1
q − 1 (1.16)
= q2 + q + 1. (1.17)
By construction, the number of blocks is identical to the number of distinct 2-
dimensional subspaces of V . In a 3-dimensional vector space, each 2-dimensional
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subspace can be be uniquely identified by its 1-dimensional dual subspace. Hence,
|B| = |X| (1.18)
= q2 + q + 1, (1.19)
and so v = |X| = |B| = b.
To determine the number of 2-dimensional subspaces containing a fixed 1-
dimensional subspace L, first note that the choice of any nonzero vector not in
L uniquely determines a 2-dimensional subspace, namely their span in V . Next,
note that two 2-dimensional subspaces of V which both include L must be disjoint
outside of L. Hence, these these 2-dimensional subspaces partition the nonzero
vectors of V \ L, and so the replication number is
r =
q3 − q
q2 − q (1.20)
= q + 1. (1.21)
Each 2-dimensional subspace W of V contains q2 − 1 nonzero vectors, and the
included 1-dimensional subspaces partition the nonzero vectors in W with each
containing exactly q − 1 vectors. Hence,
|BW | = q
2 − 1
q − 1 (1.22)
= q + 1 (1.23)
for every BW ∈ B. Therefore, we have r = q + 1 = k.
It remains to show to that the 2-design incidence condition is satisfied, namely
that any two distinct 1-dimensional subspaces of V are contained in exactly λ = 1
2-dimensional subspace of V . Since V is 3-dimensional, this inclusion relation is
satisfied only by the span of the two 1-dimensional subspaces.
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Consider two distinct 2-dimensional subspaces A and B of V . Then dim(A ∩
B) < 2 since the subspaces are distinct, but dim(A ∩ B) ≥ 1 because
dim(A ∪ B) ≤ dim(V ) (1.24)
dim(A) + dim(B)− dim(A ∩ B) ≤ dim(V ) (1.25)
dim(A ∩ B) ≥ 1. (1.26)
Hence, we have dim(A∩B) = 1, and so any two blocks share exactly one point.
Singer’s construction can easily be extended to deal with the inclusion of one-
dimensional subspaces in d-dimensional hyperplanes in the vector space GF (q)d+1.
Such a set system is called a projective geometry of order q over GF (q)d+1 de-
noted PG(d, q). For the work presented here, the projective planes PG(2, q) will
suﬃce. The symmetric 2-design featured in Example 1.2.2 follows from the Singer
construction for a projective plane with q = 2.
1.3.2 Biplanes
While we have so far concentrated on symmetric designs with λ = 1, other symmet-
ric designs do exist. These classes of symmetric designs are far less well understood
that their projective plane counterparts. One class that will be featured in later
applications are the symmetric designs with λ = 2.
Definition 1.3.2. A biplane is symmetric 2-(v, k, 2) design.
There are only finitely namely biplanes known to exist, namely for k = 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 13
[11]. Moreover, it is widely conjectured that for any λ > 1 there are only finitely
many symmetric designs.
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Example 1.3.1. Let X = {0, 1, . . . , 10} and define
B = {{1, 3, 4, 5, 9}.{2, 4, 5, 6, 10}, {3, 5, 6, 7, 0}, {4, 6, 7, 8, 1}, (1.27)
{5, 7, 8, 9, 2}, {6, 8, 9, 10, 3}, {7, 9, 10, 0, 4}, {8, 10, 0, 1, 5}, (1.28)
{9, 0, 1, 2, 6}, {10, 1, 2, 3, 7}, {0, 2, 3, 4, 8}}. (1.29)
One can verify that (X,B) is a biplane of order 3, a symmetric 2-(11,5,2) design.
1.4 Residuals of Symmetric Designs
It is often advantageous to think of a set system (X,B) as a set system (X ￿,B￿)
with points and/or blocks removed. In this way, seemingly disparate classes of
combinatorial objects can be linked. Existence results for one class can be applied
the other, and one can investigate which properties of the original set system are
preserved during the transformation. For our work here, the concept of a residual
set system will be very useful.
Definition 1.4.1. Let (X,B) be a set system. The E-residual, {E1, E2, . . . , Er} =
E ⊆ B, is the set system (X ￿,B￿) with
X ￿ = X \
￿
r￿
i=1
Ei
￿
(1.30)
B￿ =
￿
C \
￿
r￿
i=1
Ei
￿
: C ∈ B \ E
￿
. (1.31)
If E is a single set B ∈ B, we will often abuse notation and identify the E-
residual of (X,B) as the B-residual. If in addition the choice of B is understood
or irrelevant, we will refer to the B-residual as simply the residual. Symmetric
designs are unique among 2-designs in that their residuals are also 2-designs.
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Result 1.4.1. The B-residual of a symmetric 2-(v, k,λ) design (X,B) is 2-(v −
k, v − 1, k, k − λ,λ) design for every B ∈ B.
Proof. Clearly there are v− k points and v− 1 blocks in the residual. Every point
not in B in the original design remains in exactly k blocks in the residual, so the
replication number of the residual is k. By Theorem 1.3.1, every block C ∈ B\{B}
shares exactly λ points with B. Hence, every block in the residual contains exactly
k − λ points. Since every pair of points from X appear in exactly 2 blocks in B,
any pair of points in X \ B remain in exactly λ blocks in the residual. Hence, all
2-design axioms are satisfied.
Notice that we do not prove that residual of a symmetric 2-design is symmetric,
and in fact they are not.
1.4.1 Aﬃne Planes
The residual of a projective plane of order q is a 2-(q2, q2 + q, q+ 1, q, 1) design by
Result 1.4.1. Such a design is known as an aﬃne plane of order q. While an aﬃne
plane of order q can always be constructed as the residual of a projective plane of
the same order, their structure is perhaps best elucidated by a construction due
to Bose [3].
Result 1.4.2. There exits a 2-(q2, q2 + q, q+ 1, q, 1) design for every prime power
q.
Proof. Let V be the 2-dimensional vector space of the finite field GF (q). Associate
the set of points X with the q2 elements of V . For all one-dimensional subspaces
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W < V and α ∈ V , define
W + α = {w + α : w ∈ W} (1.32)
to be the translate of W by α. Define the collection of blocks to be all distinct
translates of all 1-dimensional subspaces of V . Any translate has the same cardi-
nality as the original 1-dimensional subspace, so the block size is q.
Considering the translates of a fixed 1-dimensional subspace as cosets of an
additive group, it is clear that that any two of these translates are either identical
or disjoint. Hence, there are q2/q = q distinct translates of any given 1-dimensional
subspace. From this fact, we can derive both the replication number and the
number of blocks in the candidate design.
The collection of 1-dimensional subspaces partition the set V \{0}; any vector is
included in its span, and any two linear subspaces intersect only at the zero vector.
Hence, there are (q2 − 1)/(q − 1) = q + 1 distinct 1-dimensional subspaces of V .
Since any element β ∈ V occurs in exactly one translate of each 1-dimensional
subspace, namely W +β for each 0 < W < V , we find that the replication number
is |{W : 0 < W < V }| = q + 1. Each linear subspace has exactly q distinct
translates, and no two translates of two distinct linear subspaces can be identical.
This implies that there are (q + 1)q = q2 + q total blocks.
So far we have derived all parenthetical parameters of the candidate design
except λ, and it remains to show that any two vectors in V occur in exactly one
block. Consider two vectors α, β ∈ V , and let W be the span of (α − β). (Note
that this construction is symmetric with respect to points, i.e. span(α − β) =
15
span(β − α).) Then we verify
α = (α− β) · 1 + β (1.33)
β = (α− β) · 0 + β, (1.34)
so that both α and β are contained in W + β. To prove uniqueness, assume for
contradiction that there exists another translate U + γ containing both α and β.
Then
u+ γ = α = w + β (1.35)
u￿ + γ = β = w￿ + β. (1.36)
Subtracting one equation from the other, we have
u− u￿ = w − w￿. (1.37)
But the left side is an element u￿￿ of U , and ku￿￿ is equal to the diﬀerence of elements
in W for all k ∈ GF (q). Varying k over the entirety of GF (q) generates U . Hence,
U ⊆ W . Considering the right side of the equation in the same manner shows
W ⊆ U . With containment in both directions, we have shown the uniqueness of a
translate containing any two vectors in V .
Note that since the blocks of B represent the translates of vector subspaces,
the blocks are either disjoint or have constant intersection cardinality.
As with projective planes, we can naturally extend the notion of the aﬃne plane
of order q to the aﬃne geometry AG(d, q) in which the points are the vectors of
GF (q)d, the blocks are correspond to translates of the (d−1)-dimensional subspaces
of GF (q)d, and point-block inclusion is taken set-wise [6].
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Example 1.4.1. Let X = {0, 1, 2, 5} and define
B = {{0, 1}, {2, 5}
{0, 2}, {1, 5}
{0, 5}, {1, 2}}. (1.38)
The pair (X,B) is an aﬃne plane of order 2. It is also the {3, 4, 6}-residual of the
projective plane of order 2 featured in Example 1.2.2.
1.4.2 Residuals of Biplanes
The current understanding of biplanes is much less complete than that of their
projective plane counterparts. The natural notions of geometry in the latter con-
text allow for powerful existence and structural theorems about both the projective
planes themselves and their residuals. Unfortunately, no such unifying theory has
been discovered for biplanes, and so the results here remain piece-meal. For in-
stance, biplane residuals have been documented for use in coding theory as in work
of Key and Tonchev in [21]. But on the whole, these designs have received little
attention due to a lack of firm intuitive footing.
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CHAPTER 2
SECURE RE-KEYING IN GROUP COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
2.1 Wireless Sensor Networks
In a wireless sensor network (WSN), a collection sensor nodes collect data and
wirelessly communicate these data to other sensor nodes and/or to a base station
in charge of aggregation and processing. The sensors nodes themselves are designed
to be cheap and long-lasting so that a large number can be deployed simultaneously.
The popular Zigbee wireless sensor platform supports network sizes of over 64,000
nodes each with a battery life of over 1 year [34]. As wireless sensor technologies
have matured, WSNs have been used in a wide variety of applications, including
military deployments, precision agriculture and health monitoring. For a recent
survey of uses of WSNs, see [1]. There are two primary types of WSN, hierarchical
and distributed. In a hierarchical WSN, a central authority (e.g., base station
or trust center) coordinates the network. The amount of control given to the
central authority varies. We typically assume that the central authority has greater
resources and is more secure than the sensor nodes. Hierarchical WSNs can be
eﬃciently coordinated but are sensitive to the loss or compromise of the central
authority, both of which result in network failure. In a distributed WSN, there
is no central authority coordinating the network; information flows through the
network in a distributed fashion. Distributed WSNs are more resilient to node loss
but can be less eﬃcient than their hierarchical counterparts. For our work here,
we will consider a one-level hierarchical WSN, that is, a base station overseeing
a collection of equally privileged sensor nodes. The base station will be tasked
with broadcasting a group-wide information stream and coordinating encryption
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through the distribution of cryptographic keys. It may be the case that a sensor
node cannot directly communicate with the base station. In this case, other nodes
act as intermediaries on a multi-hop path. Hence, even in a hierarchical WSN, it
is important that individual nodes maintain the ability to communicate with one
another.
Data security during transmission is a priority in many WSN applications, and
cryptography is an obvious solution. Public-key cryptography is a mainstay of
modern wired communications, but the unique constraints found in WSNs make
symmetric (private) key cryptography the preferred solution. While not an issue
with wired devices, the computationally expensive mathematical procedures and
relatively large cryptographic keys found in most public key cryptography schemes
are out of place in this context. Symmetric key cryptography, in which a single
cryptographic key is used in both encryption and decryption, is a better solution
in most WSNs. The idea of symmetric cryptography is not a new one. Clas-
sic examples of symmetric key encryption range from the Caesar cipher to the
Enigma machine. More recently, the National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST) has approved the symmetric block ciphers included in the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) for protecting data owned by the federal government
[32]. The 128-bit flavor of the AES is the specified encryption of the Zigbee stan-
dard [2]. The relative simplicity of the encryption and decryption procedures does
come at a cost, however. First, network connectivity becomes unassured, as any
two users within range of one another can securely communicate if and only if
both have access to at least one common cryptographic key. Second, an encrypted
message is decipherable to any user owning the appropriate key, not just the in-
tended recipient. In a full mesh Zigbee network operating in the commercial mode,
every pair of users possesses a unique cryptographic key in order to address these
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concerns [30]; each user of n users then owns O(n) keys. For even moderately
sized networks, this number of keys represents a considerable memory overhead
for the individual sensor nodes. When designing a reasonable solution to put in
practice, we will have to make tradeoﬀs between the connectivity and the potential
for eavesdropping within the network.
In a more general model for key distribution in a communication system em-
ploying symmetric encryption first introduced by Mitchell and Piper [29], each user
ui, i = 1, 2, . . . , b, receives a collection of keys Bi, called a key chain, drawn without
replacement from a network-wide key pool X of cardinality v. Limited memory
at the sensor nodes upper bounds the number of keys a sensor node can store.
It is typically advantageous for a sensor node to store as many keys as possible
in order to maximize the probability that it will be able to securely communicate
with its neighbors; it is therefore reasonable to assume that the key chain size k
is constant across all users. Given these assumptions, the collection X of keys
together with the collection of key chains B = {B1, B2, . . . , Bb} forms a uniform
set system (X,B) as presented in Definition 1.1.1. The combinatorial properties of
this set system can have enormous impacts on the eﬃcacy of the sensor network.
Qualitatively speaking, large key chains relative to the size of the key pool
result in higher probability that two users will share a common cryptographic key.
In the extreme case, there is a single key in the key pool, and every sensor node has
access to this key. Such a key distribution can be found in the Zigbee residential
security mode, for instance [30]. This scheme provides a small degree of security at
very low memory cost but is not preferred for critical applications, because if the
single key is compromised, then no secure communication can take place between
members of the network. In one of the first key distribution schemes, Eschenauer
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and Gligor proposed choosing the size k key chain of each of the b users of the WSN
uniformly randomly and without replacement from a key pool of size v [19]. The
probability that any two users can securely communicate is then determined by
the relative sizes of k and v. In many applications, however, firmer guarantees as
to network connectivity are needed. It is not surprising that the key distributions
satisfying these tougher constraints have more mathematical structure than those
of randomized schemes. The combinatorial t-designs investigated in Chapter 1
are a class of natural candidates due to their uniformity, regularity and incidence
conditions. The class of 2-designs are both the most plentiful known class of t-
designs and the best understood, and so we will focus our eﬀorts on these special
designs. As first document by C¸amtepe and Yener [7], a 2-design (X,B) can
be used as a key distribution for a WSN by associating the points and blocks
of the design with the keys and key chains of the key distribution, respectively.
Unfortunately, it is frequently the case that two blocks in a arbitrary 2-design
are disjoint, and so two users may not share a common cryptographic key with
which to communicate securely. In this situation, their message must pass through
one or more intermediaries along a multi-hop path. The presence of multi-hop
paths increases both latency and overhead, as nodes are required to spend more
resources communicating messages other than their own. Lee and Stinson put
forward µ-common intersection designs which ensure that there exist at least µ
distinct 2-hop paths between any two users which cannot communicate directly
[25]. Mathematically, any pair of disjoint blocks of the design have non-empty
intersections with at least µ common blocks. Chakrabarti, Maitra and Roy took
a more probabilistic approach by assigning to each user the keys associated with
multiple blocks from a 2-design [8]. In this way, many of the desirable properties
of 2-designs are preserved while increasing the probability that two users share
21
common key. This benefit comes at the cost of higher storage and administrative
costs at the sensor nodes. In many communication scenarios, probabilistic results
about network connectivity are not suﬃcient and strong claims about worst-case
performance are necessary.
If it is required that any two nodes be able to securely communicate directly,
even more structure is needed in the key distribution. The scheme of C¸amtepe
and Yener based on projective planes is in many senses optimal [7]: all users have
the same number of keys, providing uniformity among memory requirements; each
key is owned by a constant number of users, giving a constant cost if a key being
leaked to an adversary; every pair of users share a single key and so possess the
minimal amount of information required to communicate. These features do not
come free, however. A key distribution formed by a projective plane supports
far fewer users than other key distributions with identical key chain and key pool
sizes. For instance, a projective plane of order q has key chain size q+ 1, key pool
size q2 + q + 1 and supports q2 + q + 1 users, while a randomized distribution due
to Eschenauer and Gligor supports with key chain size q + 1 and key pool size
q2 + q + 1 supports
￿
q2+q+1
q+1
￿
users.
An attentive reader may have noticed that if the role of points and blocks were
interchanged in key distribution based on a 2-design, then the final axiom of a
2-design, namely that any pair of points occurs in exactly λ blocks, would imply
that any two users share exactly λ common cryptographic keys. This would be
a very desirable characteristic, but it comes at a large cost. Fischer’s inequality
states that the number of blocks is at least as large as the number of points, and
so under the alternate formulation, the number of users supported by the system
is at most the number of keys. This is not competitive with many other classes of
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key distribution schemes which typically support many more users than they have
keys.
2.2 Group Communication Systems
A group communication system is in many ways an extension of a WSN. Here,
in addition to aggregating and processing the data collected by the sensor nodes
under its control, the base station also broadcasts a so-called group communication
stream. Making the same assumptions about the necessity of data security and the
limitations of the sensor nodes, this group communication stream is symmetrically
encrypted by the base station using a group-wide session key to which every user
has access. Each user additionally owns a collection of administrative keys which
are used, for instance, to distribute a new session key if the need arises. We
typically use the term “key chain” in this context to refer to a user’s collection of
administrative keys only. Similarly, the term “key pool” in this context is used to
refer to the collection of all administrative keys.
Fluid membership makes key distribution in group communications systems a
diﬃcult task. For example, suppose that a new member joins the network. It is
possible that this new member has been recording the encrypted group commu-
nication stream before her addition to the network. Hence, if the session key is
not changed after her arrival, the new user can decrypt old communications that
she was not at the time privileged to hear; this is known as the backward secrecy
problem. For another case, suppose a member leaves or must be ejected from
the network. Clearly, the session key must be changed, because if not the ejected
member can continue decoding the private group communication to which he is no
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longer privileged; this is known as the forward secrecy problem. But member leave
is more complicated than member join, because after a user ejection the replace-
ment session key must be securely disseminated without using any administrative
key owned by the ejected user; encrypting the new session key using an administra-
tive key owned by the ejected member would be pointless, as the ejected member
could simply decrypt the replacement session key and regain access to the group
communication. When a user leaves the network, the base station generates a
fresh session key together with new administrative keys to replace those owned by
the ejected user. The new session and administrative keys are collectively known
as the re-keying message. The base station then securely distributes the re-keying
message to all remaining privileged members. The technical diﬃculty arises in
that this secure distribution must be accomplished without using any key owned
by any ejected user(s). The exact manner in which secure re-keying is achieved
can vary, and some methods are far more eﬃcient than others.
Harney and Muckenhirn were among the first to consider the problem of group
key management [20]. One of the notable limitations of their Group Key Man-
agement Protocol (GKMP) is that the system cannot be re-keyed after a user
ejection; a new group is formed after every such event. Wong, Gouda and Lam
introduced n-ary trees as group key management structures [39]. The leaves of
the tree represent keys owned by individual users, all interior nodes represent sub-
group keys and the root represents the session key. Each of v users then owns
all keys on the path from the associated leaf to the root, and so each user owns
logn v keys. These authors show that the base station must send n(logn(v) − 1)
separate encryptions of the re-keying message. This eﬃcient re-keying set comes
at the cost of increased number of total keys necessary to maintain a given num-
ber of users. To support v users using an n-ary tree, the base station must store
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￿logn v
i=0 n
i = (n1+logn v−1)/(n−1) keys. For instance, in a binary tree supporting v
users, the base station must store and administer 2v−1 keys. Eltoweissy, Heydari,
Morales and Sudborough introduced the concept of an (v, k,m) exclusion basis
system (EBS) [17]. In this set system the points represent users and the blocks
represent keys; note that this is the reverse of set systems we consider here. A
(v, k,m) EBS supports v users {1, 2, . . . , v} and can be re-keyed after the ejection
of single user e with m sets such that their union is {1, 2, . . . , e− 1, e + 1, . . . , v}.
The authors show that this scheme supports v ≤ ￿k+mk ￿ users where k is the key
chain size. We will see that this class of structures is a subset of a larger class of
combinatorial objects. Their formulation provides for support for a large number
of users, but is susceptible to collusion attacks. In the original work that follows,
we will present a scheme that is in some sense a compromise between these two
systems.
2.2.1 Cover-free Families
For a concrete example of how the re-keying problem dictates the structure of the
underlying administrative key distribution, first consider the case in which a single
user is ejected from the network. In a default re-keying solution, the base station
sequentially encrypts the re-key message with every administrative key not owned
by the ejected user and broadcasts the encrypted message. For instance, this is
the solution put forward by Eltoweissy et al. to re-key an exclusion basis system
[17]. Any privileged user remaining after the single ejection can gain access to the
replacement keys if and only if he has access to at least one administrative key not
owned by the ejected user. Hence, the system can be securely re-keyed after the
ejection of one user if and only if no key chain is identical to or a proper subset of
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any other. In symbols, B ￿ C for every pair of distinct sets B and C in B.
In general, we are concerned with the ability of the system to eject more than
one user simultaneously. If a group of users is found to be colluding to compromise
the network, they must be ejected together; if even one of the colluders receives
the replacement session key, he can distribute it to his cohort and so neutralize
the re-keying operation. Suppose again that the base station encrypts the re-key
message sequentially with each administrative key not owned by any of the ejected
members and broadcasts to the group. Then a remaining user can decrypt the
replacement keys if and only if she has access to at least one key not owned by any
of the ejected users. Mathematically speaking, the base station can successfully re-
key the network after any r simultaneous ejections if and only if no user’s key chain
is included in the union of r other key chains. The formulation of this requirement
is captured exactly in the definition of an r-cover-free family.
Definition 2.2.1. An r-cover-free family is a set system (X,B) in which any
distinct blocks B1, B2, . . . , Br and A in B satisfy
A ￿
r￿
i=1
Bi. (2.1)
In words, no union of r blocks covers any other block.
The case in which r = 1 was investigated by Sperner in the mid-1920s [35].
Here, the cover-free family is an anti-chain in the poset under inclusion of the
power set of X. Sperner bounded the size of a 1-cover-free family of an ambient
v-set X at
|B| ≤
￿
v
￿v/2￿
￿
. (2.2)
Notice that this agrees with preliminary intuition that the collection of all subsets
of size ￿v/2￿ is maximal under non-inclusion.
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The subject of cover-free families lay dormant until the 1960s when Kautz and
Singleton later investigated the more general case of r > 1 in a coding theoretic
context [23]. In data retrieval systems it is often advantageous to classify files
according to certain descriptors which are drawn form a system-wide dictionary.
A file is then identified by the collection of descriptors it satisfies. In the framework
considered by Kautz and Singleton, the descriptors themselves are associated with
binary words of length n, and a file is associated with the component-wise OR of
the descriptors it satisfies. Under what circumstances is this mapping well-defined?
For an error case, consider a file which satisfies a collection of descriptors D but not
some fixed descriptor D /∈ D. If D is logically included in the component-wise OR
of the descriptors in D, then the retrieval system would incorrectly deduce that the
file also satisfies D. Hence, if we require that the retrieval system support up to r
descriptors per file without ambiguity, no descriptor may be logically included in
the component-wise OR of any r other descriptors. Considering each component in
the length n binary word to be an element in a support setX and each descriptor as
a set containing the points from X to be the components in which the descriptor’s
binary word is equal to 1 gives the modern formulation of a r-cover-free family.
It is somehow appropriate that the first modern usage of cover-free families was
developed in application to a real world problem. Indeed, cover-free families have
been re-discovered several times exactly because their structure is so utilitarian.
Desmet et al. proposed using cover-free families to protect spread spectrum com-
munications systems from insider adversaries [15]. Cover-free families were put
forward by Colbourn, Ling and Syrotiuk for transmission scheduling in mobile ad
hoc networks without knowledge of the network topology [12]. Wang and Pieprzyk
used 2-cover-free families for anonymous membership broadcast schemes in which
a base station can broadcast a message and only the intended recipient can deduce
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the message’s destination [38]. Staddon, Stinson and Wei introduced cover-free
families as traceability codes [36]; here illegally distributed content can be traced
back to the users who colluding to pirate the content.
Cover-free families have received attention from theoreticians, as well. Erdo¨s,
Frankl and Fu¨redi gave one of the first thorough treatments of the subject from a
theoretical perspective [18]. They documented construction techniques, bounded
the cardinality of a cover-free family with given parameters and investigated the
interplay between the size of an r-cover-free family and the cover parameter r.
More recently, Stinson and Wei have produced a generalization of the concept
cover-freedom [37]: a (w, r; d)-cover-free family is a collection of subsets B of a
support set X such that any w blocks B1, B2, . . . , Bw ∈ B and r other blocks
A1, A2, . . . , Ar ∈ B satisfy ￿￿￿￿￿
￿
w￿
i=1
Bi
￿
\
￿
r￿
j=1
Aj
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ≥ d. (2.3)
The traditional notion of a r-cover-free family is included here as the class of
(1, r; 1)-cover-free families. In the applications that follow, the added power pro-
vided by this generalization will not be needed, and we will always take the term
cover-free family to mean the original, limited definition. Ling, Wang and Xing
give an excellent review of both cover-free family theory and applications [27].
As early as the late 1980s, cover-free families were recognized for their ability
to prevent collusion [29]. In the context of a WSN, if no user’s key chain lies in the
union of r other key chains, then no r users can collude to forge the key chain of
any other user. More recently, however, Xu, Chen and Wang have proposed using
an r-cover-free family as the key distribution in a group communication system
supporting up to r simultaneous user ejections [40]. In the re-keying phase, Xu
et al. stipulate that the base station first determine a collection of keys in which
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every non-ejected owns at least one of these selected keys, and no ejected member
owns any; the authors give no construction for this collection. We will simply
call any such collection of keys a re-keying set where the exact key distribution
and number of ejected users under consideration are clear. Then to re-key the
network, the base station must encrypt the re-key message with each key in the
re-keying set and broadcast the result to the network. It is obviously desirable
to minimize the size of this collection, because the no secure communication can
take place until the network has been re-keyed. At the same time, the method
for finding a minimal re-keying set should be as computationally inexpensive as
possible to minimize load at the base station. Balancing re-keying latency and the
computational complexity of determining a suitably small re-keying set is integral
to the success of a re-keying solution.
2.2.2 NP-hardness of Minimal Re-keying
Manufacturing a minimal re-keying set is related to Hitting Set, one of Karp’s
original NP-complete problems [22]. Hitting Set can be phrased as an optimization
problem in the following way: given a set X and a collection B of subsets of X,
what is the minimal cardinality of H ⊆ X such that H “hits” every set in B, that
is H ∩B ￿= ∅, for every B ∈ B. We can formalize the relationship between Hitting
Set and secure re-keying in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2.1. The problem of finding a minimal re-keying set after any number
of user leaves in a group communication system with key distribution (X ￿,B￿) is
NP-hard.
Proof. We will reduce from Hitting Set, meaning we will show that every instance of
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Hitting Set corresponds to at least one instance of the re-keying problem; therefore,
the re-keying problem is at least as diﬃcult as Hitting Set. Let X be the support
set and B the collection of subsets of X for which we want to find a minimal hitting
set. Let E be a set disjoint from X, and suppose that E represents the union of
the key chains of the ejected users. Let
Bi = B
￿
i \ E
B￿ = {B￿i : Bi ∈ B}
X ￿ = X ∪ E
so that (X ￿,B￿) is a key distribution of the network before the user ejection(s).
This mapping can clearly be performed in polynomial time. Then the Hitting Set
problem on the set system (X,B) is equivalent to the minimal re-keying problem on
the key distribution (X ￿,B￿) in the case where any user(s) owning the key collection
E is ejected from the network. Hence, Hitting Set is many-one reducible to the
minimal re-keying set problem.
We note for completeness that Wong, Gouda and Lam independently stated
(but did not prove) the NP-hardness of the re-keying problem using a Set Cover
reduction [39]. The statement of the theorem makes no assumptions about the
exact nature of the key distribution. And in general the results of a NP-hardness
theorem should be always taken with a grain of salt. The theorem does not claim
that finding a minimal re-keying set is always hopeless endeavor, but rather that
finding a minimal re-keying set for an arbitrary key distribution should be expected
to be diﬃcult. Therefore, the theorem naturally points towards only considering
key distributions with a large amount of combinatorial and/or algebraic structure
and hoping that this structure is enough to circumvent the natural diﬃculty of the
problem.
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2.3 Secure Re-keying Using Symmetric 2-Designs
We have seen in Chapter 1 that t-designs and symmetric 2-designs in particu-
lar have nice combinatorial structure. Perhaps this structure is enough to allow
for strong results as minimal hitting set cardinalities of these set systems and
their residuals. In this way, we could guarantee that symmetric 2-designs would
be suitable as key distributions in group communication systems with non-static
membership. First we must prove that after a given number of ejections a hitting
set exists. As previously discussed, for a group communication system to support
secure re-keying after any r simultaneous user leaves it is necessary and suﬃcient
that the key distribution of the network forms an r-cover-free family.
Result 2.3.1 ([18]). A symmetric 2-(v, k,λ) design (X,B) forms a ￿(k − 1)/λ￿-
cover-free family.
Proof. Fix a block B ∈ B. Because the design is symmetric, any block not equal
to B shares exactly λ points with B. Suppose there is a collection of blocks whose
cardinality λ intersections with B are disjoint from one another. Then since B has
k points, and each block in the selected collection covers exactly λ, the covering
collection must have at least ￿k/λ￿ members, and clearly no fewer will suﬃce to
cover B. Then in particular no collection of ￿k/λ￿ − 1 = ￿(k − 1)/λ￿ blocks will
cover B. Since B was chosen arbitrarily, the pair (X,B) forms a ￿(k−1)/λ￿-cover-
free family.
Theorem 1.3.1 and Result 2.3.1 shows that a symmetric 2-(v, k,λ) design is a
natural candidate for a key distribution of a group communication system since it
supports full mesh connectivity and O(k) simultaneous ejections. Projective planes
are both the most plentiful known class of symmetric 2-designs and by Result 2.3.1
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support the largest number of simultaneous user leaves relative to key chain size
k, and so we will focus our attention here.
2.3.1 Projective Plane Key Distributions
In 1978, Brouwer and Schrijver unknowingly settled the problem of minimal re-
keying in a projective plane key distribution after a single user leave. As we
discussed in Section 1.4, the residual of a projective plane of order q is an aﬃne
plane of order q, and so the collection of keys and key rings found in a projective
plane key distribution after a single user leave form the points and blocks of an
aﬃne plane. Brouwer and Schrijver bounded the number of points needed to meet
every hyperplane in AG(2, q).
Result 2.3.2 ([4]). Let (X,B) be a projective plane of order q formed by the points
and lines of PG(2, q). Then the cardinality of the minimal hitting set of the E-
residual of (X,B) is 2q − 1 for any E ∈ B.
Brouwer and Schrijver were investigating blocking and hitting sets of projective
planes and their residuals in a purely theoretic context; yet again, pure mathemat-
ics research finds its way into an applied context decades later. This result gives
a firm foundation on which to base optimality results for a single ejection from
a projective plane key distribution. The following theorem allows us to extend
optimality results to cases involving multiple simultaneous ejections.
Theorem 2.3.1. Let h0 be the cardinality of any minimal hitting set of a set
system (X,B). Then for any {E1, . . . , En} = E ⊆ B the cardinality of the minimal
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hitting set of the E-residual set system (X ￿,B￿) with
X ￿ = X \
￿
n￿
i=1
Ei
￿
(2.4)
B￿ =
￿
C \
￿
n￿
i=1
Ei
￿
: C ∈ B \ E
￿
. (2.5)
as in Definition 1.4.1 is at least h0 − n.
Proof. Let S0 be any minimal hitting set of (X,B). Consider removing any 2
points from S0 and tracking how many blocks are no longer hit by the resulting
set. Suppose that only one block is uncovered by this process. Stated diﬀerently,
there is a unique block that contains as its hitting set elements the 2 chosen points;
all other blocks contain at least one element from the hitting set that is not one of
the selected points. Hence, we could remove either of the selected points from S0
and create a hitting set with cardinality strictly less than |S0|. This contradicts the
minimality of S0, so removing two points from the hitting set necessarily uncovers
at least 2 blocks. So the contrapositive is also true, namely that removing fewer
than 2 blocks results in removing fewer than 2 points from any minimal hitting
set. Hence, a hitting set of (X \ B,B \ {B}) for some B ∈ B must have at least
|S0|− 1 points. Repeated application of this case gives the desired result.
It may seem counterintuitive that removing blocks from a set system might act
to increase the minimal hitting set cardinality, but there is an example of such
behavior close at hand.
Example 2.3.1. Let (X,B) be a projective plane of order q. Since any two blocks
in a projective plane share exactly one point, any block is a hitting set of the set
system. Hence, the size of a minimal hitting set is at most h0 ≤ q + 1. (In fact,
this is exactly the minimum hitting set cardinality, a fact which we will not prove
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here.) Now consider the residual of (X,B) after the removal of a single block.
Result 2.3.2 states that the minimal hitting set of the set system has cardinality
2q − 1. Hence, removing a block from the set system acts to increase the minimal
hitting set cardinality for any q > 1.
There are several constructions of hitting sets of cardinality 2q − 1 for the
residual of a projective plane of order q, and Result 2.3.2 shows that all such
hitting sets are optimal; we will present one such construction in the following
theorem. But theoretical investigation of these hitting sets stops here; to the
author’s knowledge, no work has been done on determining the minimal hitting
set of the residual of a projective plane after two or more block removals. Theorem
2.3.1 provides a framework for discussing optimality hitting sets in these scenarios.
We next show that a minimal hitting set of size 2q − 2 of a projective plane after
any two block removals is in fact achievable.
Theorem 2.3.2. Given a key distribution (X,B) based on a projective plane of
order q, a minimal re-keying set after the ejection of a single member contains
2q − 1 points, and a minimal re-keying set after the simultaneous ejection of two
members contains 2q − 2 points.
Proof. Fix E ∈ B as the user that is to be ejected. Choose any other user B ∈
B \ {E} and let xe = B ∩E. Now, B shares exactly 1 point with every remaining
block, and it is either the case that this point is xe or it isn’t. There are q − 1
blocks in the first class, all of them necessarily disjoint from each other. We can
use as a rekeying set B \ {xe} together with one point from each of these q − 1
blocks. Hence, the minimal rekeying set size is at most q + (q − 1) = 2q − 1. The
work of Brouwer and Schrijver featured in Result 2.3.2 shows that this number of
points is also necessary.
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Now suppose that users E1, E2 ∈ B leave the system. Since q ≥ 2, there exists
at least B ∈ B such that E1 ∩ B = xe = B ∩ E2. Every block in B shares exactly
one element with B and in only q−2 blocks besides E1 and E2 is this point xe, and
these q−3 blocks are necessarily disjoint outside of xe. Hence, it suﬃces to take as
a re-keying set B \ {xe} and any one point from each of the q− 2 remaining blocks
which contain xe. Thus, a re-keying set of cardinality 2q − 2 is suﬃcient to re-key
a projective plane key distribution after two simultaneous ejections. Result 2.3.2
together with Theorem 2.3.1 shows that this number of points is also necessary.
One can imagine making similar arguments as those in the proof of Theorem
2.3.2 for the cases of more than two simultaneous ejections. However, due to the
structure of symmetric 2-designs not all ejection cases are isomorphic, that is, the
properties of the minimal re-keying set will be dependent on exactly which users
were ejected together. For instance, in the case of three simultaneous user leaves
from a projective plane key distribution, it may or may not be the case that all
three users share a common key. One can easily verify using arguments similar to
those above that the size of the minimal re-keying set is dependent on whether this
property is satisfied. Rather than enumerate a growing list of cases for increasing
number of ejections, we will point out that a re-keying set is guaranteed by Result
2.3.1 for any collection of k − 1 or fewer simultaneous user leaves. In Section 2.4
we will present an algorithm which produces optimal results for the cases of one
and two simultaneous ejections and significantly smaller re-keying sets for larger
numbers of user leaves than the current available technologies are able to produce.
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Table 2.1: Comparison of binary tree, projective plane and exclusion basis system
key distributions parameters for fixed key chain size k
Binary tree Projective plane Exclusion basis system
Users supported 2k k2 − k + 1 ￿k+mk ￿
Key pool size 2k+1 − 1 k2 − k + 1 k +m
Key chain size k k k
Re-key messages k − 1 2k − 3 m
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2.3.2 Biplane Key Distributions
Standing by themselves, it is diﬃcult to tell whether the optimal re-keying sets
from Theorem 2.3.2 are “good”. It may be the case that a slight alteration of
the structure of the key distribution could give better re-keying performance at
little or no cost to the other desirable qualities of the communication system. One
natural place to begin a comparison is with the symmetric 2-(v, k, 2) biplanes.
Theorem 2.3.3. Given a key distribution (X,B) based on a biplane of order q ≥ 2,
a minimal re-key set after the ejection of a single member contains at most q
keys, and a minimal re-keying set after the simultaneous ejection of two members
contains at most q keys.
Proof. We will upper bound the rekeying load in this scenario by explicit construc-
tion of suitable rekeying sets.
For the case of a single ejection, let E ∈ B be the key chain of the ejected
user. Choose any B ∈ B \ {E}, and define Xe = B ∩ E. Every pair of blocks
shares exactly two common points, and every pair of points occurs in exactly two
blocks. Hence, the only blocks containing Xe are E and B themselves, and every
other block contains at least one point in B \Xe. Thus, the rekeying load for this
scenario is at most k − 2 = q.
For the case of two simultaneous ejections, let E1, E2 ∈ B be the key chains of
the ejected user. The replication number and the order of a biplane are related
by r = q + 2. Since q ≥ 2, we have r ≥ 4. Hence it is possible to choose
B ∈ B \ {E1, E2} such that B contains a point xe found in both E1 and E2. The
collection B ∩ (E1 ∪E2) must contain exactly 3 points. If it contained 2, then the
two points E1 ∩ E2 would occur in more than two blocks, a contradiction of the
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2-design axiom. If it contained 4, then the intersections B ∩ E1 and B ∩ E2, each
having cardinality 2, would be disjoint, a contradiction on our choice of B.
Any block B￿ ∈ B \ {E1, E2} is hit by B \ (E1 ∪ E2) unless both of the points
shared between B￿ and B occur in B ∩ (E1 ∪ E2) = {xe, y, z}. Without loss of
generality, suppose that the pair {xe, y} occurs in both B and E1 and that the pair
{xe, z} occurs in both B and E2. The remaining pair {y, z} appears in B and one
other block U . Hence, this block U is the only block not hit by the set B\(E1∪E2).
It suﬃces to take one point from U to complete the re-keying set. Hence, there
exists a re-keying set of size |B|−B ∩ (E1 ∪E2) + 1 = k − 3 + 1 = k − 2 = q.
Unfortunately, there is no known biplane equivalent of Result 2.3.2, and so far
a proof has alluded the author. We can, however, establish that in some cases the
bounds from Theorem 2.3.3 are tight.
An order q = 2 biplane is a 2-(7,4,2) design. To improve on the bound in
this case, a hitting set of cardinality 1 of a E-residual or {E1, E1}-residual of the
biplane must be found. But this is impossible, since ever point occurs in exactly
4 blocks. Hence, one point is not suﬃcient to hit the 6 blocks remaining after one
ejection or the 5 blocks left after two ejections.
Next, take for instance the case of ejections from the biplane of order q = 3
featured in Example 1.3.1. To improve on the result above, a re-keying set with
fewer than q = 3 keys must be constructed. Any key hits k = 5 key chains, any
single pair of keys occurs in exactly two blocks. Hence, any pair of points hits
2k − 2 = 8 key chains by inclusion-exclusion. There are v = 11 users Clearly no
set of q− 1 = 2 keys is suﬃcient for either the one or two ejection case, and so the
bounds from Theorem 2.3.3 above are tight when q = 3.
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Suppose now that the key distribution is based on the biplane of order q = 4,
so that k = 6. A re-keying set improving on Theorem 2.3.3 has at most 3 keys. By
inclusion exclusion, any three 3 keys hits at most 3k−2￿32￿+ ￿33￿ = 18−6+1 = 13
key chains. There are 16 blocks in the original biplane, and so a set of any 3 keys
is insuﬃcient to re-key the system after the ejection of one or two users, and so
the bounds Theorem 2.3.3 are tight when q = 4.
We can encapsulate these ideas in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3.4. Given a key distribution (X,B) based on a biplane of order 2 ≤
q ≤ 2, a minimal re-key set after the ejection of a single member contains q
keys, and a minimal re-keying set after the simultaneous ejection of two members
contains q keys. Hitting sets of these cardinalities are achievable.
This is where this type of reasoning about minimal hitting sets in residuals of bi-
planes runs dry. The tactic used by Brouwer and Schrijver to determine cardinality
of a minimal hitting set of AG(d, q) relies heavily on the vector space interpreta-
tion of the set system. Unfortunately, there is no straight-forward equivalent in
the context of biplanes; these set systems are defined by axioms that are not in
agreement with those of finite geometry, and to date there has been no successful
work in connecting biplanes of arbitrary order outside of their axiomatic definition.
We will see later in the form of simulation results that the bound presented in the
previous theorems can certainly be improved for larger orders.
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2.4 Hitting Set Constructions
While in general finding a minimal hitting set is hard, there do exist approxima-
tion algorithms which guarantee that the hitting set produced will be at most a
multiplicative factor times the minimal cardinality. Take for instance the following
greedy algorithm for finding a hitting set of the residual set system (X,B).
Greedy algorithm
(0) H ← ∅; B￿ ← B; X ￿ ← X
(1) H ← H ∪ {x} such that x ∈ X ￿ and |{B ∈ B￿ : x ∈ B}| is maximal
(2) X ￿ ← X ￿ \ {x}
(3) B￿ ← {B \X ￿ : B ∈ B￿ and B ∩H = ∅}
(4) if H is a hitting set of B, return H; else, go to (1).
We note for clarity that if in Step (1) there are multiple valid choices for x,
we select one uniformly at random. Chvatal showed that this algorithm produces
hitting sets that are at most ln(k) times the minimal hitting set cardinality [10].
We will see that in practice, the algorithm performs much better than this bound
for residuals of symmetric designs.
The default re-keying solution is to take as the re-keying set all keys not owned
by any ejected user. One can imagine that such a scheme does not provide com-
petitive results. So instead we compare the greedy algorithm to a randomized
construction in which keys chosen uniformly randomly without replacement from
the key pool and until the accumulated collection forms a re-keying set.
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Randomized algorithm
(0) H ← ∅
(1) H ← H ∪ {x} with x ∈ X \H chosen uniformly randomly
(2) if H is a hitting set of B, return H; else, go to (1).
The data presented in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.4 detail the performance of the
greedy algorithm when applied to the key distribution based on a projective plane
of order 11. For each data point, users where chosen uniformly randomly without
replacement and ejected from the network. The greedy and randomized algorithms
were then performed on the residual set system and the cardinalities of these
re-keying sets were recorded. (Note that since the projective plane of order 11
forms an 11-cover-free according to Result 2.3.1, both algorithms are guaranteed to
terminate documented data points.) The procedure was repeated N = 1000 times.
Error bars in Figure 2.4 have width 4 times the standard error σ/
√
N , where σ
is the sample standard deviation. Result 2.3.2 and Theorem ?? imply that the
minimal cardinalities of a re-keying sets after one ejection and two simultaneous
ejections for this key distribution are 21 and 20, respectively, and indeed the greedy
algorithm produces such minimal re-keying sets for all N trials. For greater than 2
simultaneous ejections, the greedy algorithm exhibits near constant performance,
requiring roughly separate encryptions of the replacement keys in order to secure
the network after the simultaneous ejection of 3 to 11 users. Note that the default
re-keying scheme is competitive with neither the randomized nor greedy algorithm.
Table 2.3 features sample mean and standard deviation data from N = 1000
trials of the greedy and randomized algorithms applied to the key distribution
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based on a biplane of order 7. (Note that biplane of order 7 forms 4-cover-free
family by Result 2.3.1.) Figure 2.4 displays this data; error bars in Figure 2.4
have width 4 times the standard error σ/
√
N , where σ is the sample standard
deviation. The results are similar to those observed in the projective plane example
with a few notable exceptions. For the cases of one ejection and two simultaneous
ejections, the greedy algorithm sometimes produces hitting sets of cardinality 6.
This performance beats the upper bounds guaranteed by Theorem 2.3.3. We have
shown, however, that Theorem 2.3.3 is tight for q ≤ 6. Together, these facts imply
that the minimal hitting sets of biplanes have more interesting structure than those
of projective planes. For more than 2 simultaneous ejections, the greedy algorithm
has near constant performance. Note that the default re-keying scheme is not
competitive with either of the other two algorithms.
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Table 2.2: Comparison of the sample mean µ (sample standard deviation σ) cardi-
nalities with N = 1000 for greedy, random and default re-keying set construction
algorithms for a projective plane of order 11
No. ejections Greedy Random Default
1 21.00 (0.00) 45.61 (7.59) 121.00 (0.00)
2 20.00 (0.00) 44.13 (6.76) 110.00 (0.00)
3 20.18 (0.43) 43.16 (6.36) 99.93 (0.25)
4 20.05 (0.53) 42.27 (6.43) 90.70 (0.50)
5 20.06 (0.62) 40.84 (5.73) 82.25 (0.70)
6 20.07 (0.65) 39.68 (5.40) 74.54 (0.92)
7 20.09 (0.72) 38.61 (4.94) 67.51 (1.11)
8 20.10 (0.76) 37.03 (4.91) 61.01 (1.39)
9 20.20 (0.79) 35.90 (4.35) 55.19 (1.53)
10 20.31 (0.86) 35.13 (4.04) 49.90 (1.65)
11 20.42 (0.92) 33.82 (3.68) 45.03 (1.80)
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Table 2.3: Comparison of the sample mean µ (sample standard deviation σ) cardi-
nalities with N = 1000 for greedy, random and default re-keying set construction
algorithms for a biplane of order 7
No. ejections Greedy Random Default
1 6.97 (0.16) 11.66 (2.14) 28.00 (0.00)
2 6.99 (0.19) 10.66 (1.69) 21.00 (0.00)
3 6.91 (0.40) 9.75 (1.38) 15.57 (0.49)
4 6.85 (0.54) 8.91 (1.07) 11.48 (0.75)
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Figure 2.1: Plot of the data featured in Table 2.2 with error bar width representing
4 times the standard error σ/
√
1000
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Figure 2.2: Plot of the data featured in Table 2.3 with error bar width representing
4 times the standard error σ/
√
1000
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CHAPTER 3
ADVANCED METERING INFRASTRUCTURE
3.1 Neighborhood Area Networks
The increasing availability of accurate, real-time electricity consumption data has
the potential to substantially increase both the eﬃciency and the quality of service
oﬀered by utility providers. With knowledge of current conditions, power compa-
nies and their business partners can reduce waste by bringing generators online
only when inferred demand begins to outstrip current supply. Real-time demand
statistics also enable service providers to price electricity on a hourly or finer
timescale. Customers who are provided with this pricing information can make
better-informed choices as to when to perform energy-intensive tasks. These lo-
cal cost-saving behaviors, known as economic demand response, organically flatten
global demand. A reduced peak-to-average demand ratio further benefits electric-
ity providers and their customers by eliminating the need to support generators
which may only operate in extreme usage scenarios. The ensemble of technologies
used to gather and analyze the electricity consumption data necessary to make de-
mand response possible is known as advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). The
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has estimated that as of 2010,
AMI penetration in the United States reached 8.7% nationwide and over 13% in
some areas, with over 500 groups oﬀer demand response services [14]. This level of
participation represents an 85% increase in a two year period. The advancement of
AMI is also receiving significant fiscal support from the federal government. The
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act has so far awarded over $790 million
dollars for AMI development and deployment [33], and in addition AMI projects
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have received funding through federal commitments to the modernization of the
nation’s electrical grid. We note that while the work presented here will focus on
the applications of AMI to distribution of electricity, it is becoming more prevalent
to use similar advanced metering technologies and techniques in water and natural
gas utilities.
In the deployment of a distribution system featuring AMI, homes are first
retrofitted with “smart” meters as replacement for traditional mechano-electric
meters. These smart meters monitor consumption in the usual way on an hourly
or sub-hourly basis and in addition transmit usage data to a neighborhood-wide
collection station at least once daily [14]. A collection station oversees the neigh-
borhood area network (NAN) by aggregating consumption statistics and sending
a summary to the electricity provider. Transmissions from smart meters to collec-
tion stations are typically wireless to facilitate easy installation, while the backhaul
from the collection station to the electricity provider is typically a wired connec-
tion. The 2010 FERC AMI definition specifies that in return for the consumption
data gathered from smart meters, electricity providers must supply customers with
current utility price information at least once daily; the definition does not specify
the mode in which this information be conveyed, however. On top of this base
level of service, one can imagine entrusting further functionality to the AMI, in-
cluding providing fine grain (e.g. sub-daily or more frequent) pricing data, sending
pricing data directly to the home via the smart meter, emergency consumption re-
duction for outage avoidance, quality of service monitoring and remote disconnect
capabilities.
The potential for AMI to be a transformative set of technologies is directly
tied to its perceived security. Accurate prediction of system-wide demand requires
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large-scale participation, and universal adoption of a non-secure system is not
realistic. Customers are less likely to accept a system which does not closely
their guard personal information or does not provide strong assurances that the
pricing data and commands received at the home smart meter can be trusted.
Privacy issues related to utility consumption data have been receiving attention
at both the federal and state levels. The 2010 Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber
Security published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
documents the need for the security of consumer data to remain a priority as smart
grid technologies advance and are deployed [31]. The California Public Utilities
Commission has recently dealt with privacy issues related to the availability of
customer utility consumption data both to the customers themselves and to “other
interested persons” [13]. More recently, President Obama has ordered a 60 day
cyber-security review, including the security of the nation’s electric grid. These
concerns are not unfounded. Lisovich, Mulligan and Wicker have shown that even
the coarse-grain consumption information provided by AMI can be used to infer
details as to what is taking place within a household [28]. Lerner and Mulligan
have detailed potential types of abuse stemming from unencrypted AMI data and
discussed Fourth Amendment implications to AMI data availability [26]. Without
encryption on the provider-to-customer link, a system with AMI is vulnerable to
attacks in which an adversary impersonates the utility provider. Depending on
the level of control over individual homes given to the provider through a smart
meter, such an impersonation could result in consequences ranging from incorrect
pricing information to termination of services.
At its core, AMI is a wireless sensor network (WSN) as described in Section 2.1.
Advanced metering systems which provide feedback to consumers through smart
meters have a level of infrastructure on top of the underlying WSN. In addition
49
to communicating securely with the base station, each consumer must be able to
decode the group-wide pricing information and commands being transmitted via
the NAN collection station. In other words, this additional functionality forms a
group communication system as discussed in Section 2.2.
3.2 Home Area Networks
Next generation utility technology will also focus on intra-home applications. A
base station within the home, perhaps taking the form of the smart meter itself,
will collect consumption information from individual appliances using non-intrusive
load monitor (NILM) technology. In the past, NILM technology has centered on
feature-detection at the home-wide level, that is, extracting appliance load signa-
tures from a single home-wide monitoring point [16]. This is a complicated problem
as the load monitor must be trained to recognize the power consumption signatures
of individual appliances from aggregate data. Suitably sophisticated techniques
including neural network training and cluster detection have been put forward as
possible solutions; see the work of Zeifman and Roth for a recent overview [41].
Many consumer devices (e.g., OWL, TED, PowerCost) incorporate some or all
aspects of this technology.
Another appliance-level monitoring strategy involves placing sensors on indi-
vidual appliances. Each sensor then transmits the power drawn by its associated
appliance to a collection station. In this way, the signatures are already disaggre-
gated. For instance, the Chinese firm Sailwider has developed an appliance-level
monitoring system in which a sensor is placed between the appliance and a stan-
dard electrical outlet. In another system, General Electric is developing a collection
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of appliances that will interface with the company’s Brillion consumption moni-
toring platform. The end-to-end control of this system provides the home-wide
station the ability to alter the functional behavior of appliances based on current
utility prices. This bi-directional communication constitutes a group communica-
tion system. Such systems present the same security risks as their AMI equivalents
discussed above and perhaps even more so. Since each appliance is transmitting
its consumption, an eavesdropper could potentially determine the number, make,
model and operational schedule of a home’s monitored appliances. Moreover, the
collection of appliances in a home changes over time, and the event of membership
change in the network must be considered. Intra-home appliance-level monitoring
and control technologies are still in their infancy, however, and no common plat-
form has been converged upon. It is unclear whether wireless sensor motes with
limited computational and batter life (like the ones considered in this text) will
come out the winners.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
We have presented in this work a scheme for a cryptographic key pre-distribution
and secure re-keying based on symmetric 2-designs. These combinatorial objects
are natural candidates due to their highly regular structure and well-documented
construction algorithms. We provided results showing that a symmetric 2-(v, k,λ)
design forms a ￿(k − 1)/λ￿-cover-free family. This prevents up ￿(k − 1)/λ￿ users
from pooling their key chains in order to impersonate another user. Moreover, this
same structure allows secure re-keying after up to ￿(k − 1)/λ￿ simultaneous user
ejections. We showed that in general the problem of finding a collection of keys
suitable for re-keying a group communication system after even one user ejection is
NP-hard. Fortunately, the combinatorial structure of symmetric 2-designs allowed
us to circumvent the natural diﬃcult of this problem. We provided an algorithm
for constructing a re-keying set after one or two simultaneous user ejections from
a projective plane key distribution, and produced a combination of known results
and novel work to show that these re-keying sets are minimal. We provided a sim-
ilar construction for biplane key distributions; we proved the re-keying sets here
are minimal in some cases. For more than two simultaneous ejections in either of
these key distributions, we cited a well-known approximation algorithm for Hitting
Set. We provided simulation results documenting that this algorithm performs sig-
nificantly better than existing solutions. We compared these symmetric 2-design
schemes to existing key distributions on a number of diﬀerent metrics.
We presented a sample application of this technology in the form of advanced
metering infrastructure (AMI), on both the home and appliance level. We doc-
umented existing literature showing that the information being passed from con-
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sumer to utility provider through the AMI presents a potential privacy hazard,
and we concluded the wireless sensor networks being deployed to monitor end-user
utility consumption as part of the AMI should be symmetrically encrypted. One
such solution has been presented in the main body of this work.
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